This paper draws on a study of the implementation of business process reengineering (BPR) in a UK National Health Service (NHS) hospital to examine the challenge of effecting a transformatory shift to a new form of process organization in a large and complex public service organization. The paper's theoretical and empirical interests go beyond BPR by bringing together literatures about organizational transformation, new organizational forms and the new public management (NPM) in a novel way. Data reveal important limits to intended organizational transformation and develop findings about sedimented rather than transformational change and the limitations of radical top-down change strategies in professionalized public service organizations. Within the domain of public service organizations, the paper also advances a new argument about why intended moves to post-NPM forms may remain contained in scope.
Is a strategy of 'big bang' change in large and complex organizations wise, or indeed even achievable? This paper draws on a study of the implementation of business process reengineering (BPR) in a UK National Health Service (NHS) hospital to examine the challenge of effecting a transformatory shift to a new form of process organization in a large and complex public service organization. Our study reveals important limits to intended organizational transformation. This is explained in terms of a contradiction between process organization ideals and pre-existing organizational arrangements and relationships already developed within UK public service organizations as part of the phenomenon widely known as the new public management (NPM). We make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. The paper's theoretical approach brings together literatures about organizational transformation, new organizational forms and the new public management in a novel way. On this basis, we suggest that a 'sedimented' rather than 'transformational' form of change (in which former ways of organizing retain resilience) may be dominant. Within the domain of public service organizations, we use this theoretical position to advance a new argument about why intended moves to post-NPM forms may remain more contained in scope than has often been argued.
Organizational transformation is clearly implied in the idealized image of 'process organization' and the rhetoric of BPR which claims to effect dramatic change and improvement in organizational processes and performance. However, literature about BPR and organizational transformation is often general or normative in tone and lacks a high-quality empirical base. There are some important weaknesses in current empirical literature on BPR. Selfreports from sponsoring managers and other participants are open to criticism that information presented is partial and unduly positive. In addition, managerial interest in change programmes such as BPR is often short lived, so that inadequate attention is accorded to assessing whether the benefits promised at the start of the change process in the end materialized. Empirical research has a role to play in holding managerial decision makers to retrospective account and lengthening attention spans.
Our empirical data are drawn from a longitudinal comparative case study of the career of reengineering in a large acute hospital in the UK during the 1990s. The identification of BPR (Denison 1997) as the process perspective that has had greatest impact on business practice implies that this study may also be a contribution to the very limited empirical knowledge about attempted organizational transformations designed to effect a process-based form of organization (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000) .
The case study data show that radical ambitions of organizational transformation gave way to convergent change, largely reproductive of the functionally based organizing arrangements that existed before reengineering. The limited possibilities for senior management to pursue strategic choice and change in the absence of control over basic clinical work processes which might enable them to drive change in the top-down fashion advocated in the normative literature is confirmed. This well-observed change leadership dilemma is given a new twist by our observation of collaboration between local managers and clinicians in preserving existing functional organizing arrangements and jurisdictions. The dynamics of reproduction in this case are seen not simply to be of local significance but are indicative of a wider contradiction between new public management (NPM) arrangements and process organization ideals. This suggests that the prospects are unfavourable for establishing post-NPM principles for the organization and delivery of public services more widely.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction the literature review relates the debate about process organization, BPR, organizational transformation and the new public management. A conceptual framework is developed to examine the aspirations and effects of BPR in practice and locate a process perspective within the context of the pre-existing NPM archetype . Thereafter the second half of the paper reports case data covering a period between 1994 and 1998. The data both describe and explain the introduction and impact of reengineering within a UK hospital. The conclusions reveal the limits to organizational transformation and discuss the resilience of the NPM archetype which blunted the intended radical shift to a process perspective of organizing.
Literature Review Analysing Process Transformation
An awareness of increased environmental turbulence and attention to organizational change as a core organizational capability inform a growing academic and policy interest in the theme of transforming contemporary organizations. A novel 'process perspective' is challenging 'functional' principles of organizing adhered to for the best part of a century. Denison's (1997) characterization of the ideal typical 'process organization' is one where the primary issue of organizational design is creating value. Organizing is understood not as a series of functional units or business units but as a collection of interrelated processes that create value.
Business process reengineering, defined as 'the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical contemporary measures of performance such as cost, quality, service and speed' (Hammer and Champy 1993: 32) , is considered one of the most high-profile ideas related to process organization (Denison 1997) . BPR gained in influence in the 1990s, diffusing quickly from its American, manufacturing origins to Europe and non-manufacturing settings, including public service organizations. BPR appeared as a head-on challenge to the organization of work into functional, departmental, specialist boundaries adjudged to encourage people to pursue sectional goals and lose sight of the overall work process and the objective of value creation for customers. As the key idea of BPR, Hammer and Champy (1993) championed organizing around core business processes as the antidote to dysfunctional segmentation. The primary goal of BPR was to effect transformatory organizational (re)design through the identification of core business processes within organizations and construction of complementary information and reward systems which would support core processes.
Empirical research that seeks to assess and understand whether BPR produces organizational transformation in real-world organizations needs to be guided by a more precise concept of organizational transformation and associated operational criteria. To scrutinize the transformational claims and effects of process organization or BPR in practice, it is necessary to identify those works that analyse and theorize the scale and pace of change in organizations in both a theoretical and empirically robust manner Ferlie et al. 1996; Child and Smith 1987; Pettigrew 1985) .
So what is an 'organizational transformation'? Tushman and Romanelli's (1985) concept of 'transformation' involves sharp and simultaneous shifts in strategy, distribution of organizational power, structure and control mechanisms. Pettigrew (1985 Pettigrew ( , 1987 conceptualizes strategic change and transformation as change in dominant ideologies, cultural systems of meaning and power relations within the organization. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) use the concept of 'archetype' to operationalize the concept of organizational transformation. An 'archetype' refers to a configuration of structures and systems of organizing with a common orientation or 'underlying interpretative scheme'. Organizational transformation is theorized to occur with a change in the dominant archetype, while convergent change is regarded as fine-tuning within the parameters of an existing archetype. Revolutionary and evolutionary change are distinguished by the scale and pace of upheaval and adjustment. Whereas evolutionary change occurs slowly and gradually, revolutionary change happens swiftly and affects all parts of the organization simultaneously Hinings 1996: 1024) .
By comparison, Ferlie et al.'s (1996) model for assessing organizational transformation is focused on actions and related consequences as well as change in underlying meanings of professional work. The model consists of the following indicators of transformation: multiple and interrelated changes across the system as a whole; the creation of new organizational forms at a collective level; the development of multilayered changes which impact below the whole system, at unit and individual level; the creation of changes in the services provided and in the mode of delivery; the reconfiguration of power relations (especially the formation of new leadership groups); the development of a new culture, ideology and organizational meaning. Only when all six criteria have been fulfilled is it possible to talk of a completed organizational transformation. Though Ferlie et al.'s model was developed and applied at the healthcare sector level of analysis, it is well suited to studying a BPR-inspired attempt at transformation at the organizational level. Aspirations for BPR and process organization relate closely to these indicators. Hammer and Champy (1993) argue reengineering implies system-wide change that favours a lateral approach to organizing over a horizontal, functional approach. Organizing around the logic of core business processes as opposed to functions requires multiple interrelated and complementary changes to system procedures and processes. BPR also promotes and promises depth (as well as breadth) change with a system-wide change impacting upon the work and relations of units and individuals. The ideological and cultural accompaniment to the change in structures and processes is revealed by attention to value creation in a market context.
In addition to suggesting effects that are empirically indicative of transformation, these scholarly works also suggest transformation to be a complex process operating simultaneously at several levels of organization and with a highly uncertain sequencing and outcome. They consistently caution against supremely confident and simplistic linear connections between managerial action and change outcomes (Pettigrew 1987; Child and Smith 1987) . One is struck by its dissonance from the confident assumptions evident within the normative literature about change in general and BPR in particular in relation to the ability of organizational leaders to choose and effect organizational transformation.
Dynamics of Organizational Transformation
Recent developments in change theorizing generate better theories of the possibilities, problems and processes involved in effecting organizational transformation than much of the normative change and BPR literature. Excessively deterministic or voluntaristic conceptions of change are being replaced within contemporary change literature. Contextualist (Pettigrew 1985) , structurationist (Child 1997; Giddens 1984 ) and co-evolutionary (Lewin and Volberda 1999) perspectives promote an understanding of change that takes account of interplay between structural and agency dynamics, and at multiple levels of analysis. Institutional analysis, which for so long has operated at a level of organizational field or population to explain processes of stability, is now explicitly concerned to embrace a greater interest in change and in so doing is recognizing macro and micro relations and interactions (Dacin et al. 2002) . Greenwood and Hinings' (1996) neo-institutional model of radical change is more accommodating of agency than earlier institutional theory. It proposes analysing radical change as interaction between 'exogenous' dynamics (market context and institutional context) and 'endogenous' dynamics of interests, values, power dependencies and capacity for action. Radical change is associated with the following endogenous precipitating dynamics: group dissatisfaction with accommodation of interests within the existing dominant template for organizing, coupled with a 'value-commitment ('competitive' or 'reformative') to an alternative template. From these dynamics flow an internal pressure for change, the intensity of which is an outcome of links to market and institutional contexts. However, for radical change to occur, these precipitating dynamics have to be complemented by the 'enabling dynamics' of 'supportive power dependencies' and 'capacity for action'. The political nature of organizations and change requires power to be mobilized to promote preferences and interests. Individuals and groups differ in their ability to access and mobilize power resources in pursuit or defence of change. Radical change is specifically seen as requiring those in positions of power to favour proposed change. Institutional and market pressures may shift power dependencies in favour of an alternative template but radical change will only result if the 'dominant coalition' recognizes the weakness of the existing template and is aware of potential alternatives. A second enabler of radical change is 'capacity for action'. Capacity for action refers to '... the ability to manage the transition between templates of organising' Hinings 1996: 1039) . It is a function of understanding the new conceptual destination, being able to manage how to get there, and having skills and competencies required to function in that new destination. In the case of BPR the concept of capacity for action is rooted in a 'big bang' approach to change that utilizes high investment in a pre-packaged product and a prescribed technology designed to effect planned programmed organizational transformation (Pettigrew 1998) .
These developments remind us that the empirical study of organizational change and transformation requires that the analysis of the content and process of change should not be abstracted from the context that gives that change form, meaning and dynamic (Pettigrew 1985) . Attention to agency should be combined with the recognition that organizations are contextually embedded phenomena with 'deep structures' that are frequently reproduced. Literature on change and restructuring in professional services organizations analogous to hospitals fails to substantiate the suggestion that transformation is a uniform and linear top-down change process (Greenwood et al. 1990) . At a time when corporate management systems are reportedly strengthening within professional service contexts, contemporary analyses of professional service contexts such as law, accountancy and health identify the presence of 'sedimented' rather than 'transformed' organizational conditions where diverse sets of beliefs and values are embedded in dynamic organization structures and processes. Sedimented organizational dynamics have so far been theorized as schizoid, insecure and rather uncertain outcomes of organizational change Cooper et al. 1996) .
At the more substantive level, confidence in the transformational capability to effect BPR is punctured by a swelling body of empirical evidence that indicates unfulfilled promise and other unwelcome effects of BPR. Survey evidence reports failure rates of 70-80% and cases of process improvement and simplification, rather than dramatic transformation, are cited to argue that BPR has not proven so radical and impacting on the bottom line of the organization as promised (Benders and Van Veen 2001; Knights and Willmott 2000; Grint and Willcox 1995) .
Process Transformation, Public Service Organizations and the New Public Management
In UK public services, the contemporary logic of organizing has been described as the new public management (NPM). NPM is seen as a 'mega shift' in the organization and management of public services in the 1980s and 1990s and the UK represents a 'high impact' case internationally (Ferlie et al. 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) . The NPM wave of restructuring has strengthened vertical lines of reporting in many public service organizations through the advancement of managerialism and performance measurement. In these respects it accords with functional organizing principles and the ethos of control and coordination (Denison 1997) .
UK healthcare is a particularly high impact sector for the NPM. In terms of managerialization, new general management roles were introduced into the NHS by government in 1985, and have endured. Marketization was promoted by the political decision to introduce an internal market experiment . Though the internal market was seemingly abolished with the change of political control in 1997, the distinction between providers and purchasers of healthcare has been maintained. As of 2003, internal market principles seem once more to be favoured by policy. Measurement processes were strongly developed through the progressive elaboration of performance indicators and performance management systems, and the growth of external audit and regulatory bodies, such as the Audit Commission and more recently the Commission for Health Improvement.
Notwithstanding these NPM-style reforms, an important distinguishing feature of the healthcare sector remains the dynamic of professional autonomy associated with the status of medicine as an elite profession. There has not been the straightforward managerialization process evident in public organizations with weaker occupational groups, such as teachers. Instead, the shift has been more to a managed professional public organization model, which represents the public sector analogue of the 'managed professional business' form (Hinings et al. 1999 ). In the 'managed professional public organization' form, traditional forms of professional autonomy are more constrained by managerial frameworks. Nevertheless, professional autonomy remains an important element of organizing, particularly at the micro or clinical level. There is a combination of the following features: more elaborate general managerial roles and structures; more intense pressure from markets and customers from outside the organization; top-down pressure for performance from more demanding 'head offices', monitored through performance management systems; the development of strategic management capacity across the organization as a whole; the development of more local management systems and processes designed to manage blocks of service facing escalating performance pressures and a retention of professional control over micro-or clinical-level forms of work. It is thus argued that within UK healthcare organizations, sedimented arrangements are apparent involving an emergent market and managerial-based archetype developed in the NHS during the 1990s alongside a well-established professional archetype (Kitchener 1999) .
For example, managerial tasks are increasingly undertaken by clinicians (often on a part-time basis) with support from professional managers offering general management and financial skills. Considerable numbers of doctors have been drawn into the management process as clinical directors (Fitzgerald and Ferlie 2000) . Clinical directorates diffused in the late 1980s and 1990s across the NHS. They are the health sector equivalent of strategic business units, given some delegated freedoms to meet objectives but also strongly accountable upwards to the corporate centre. Clinical directorates are managerially inspired and defined groupings of clinical specialties and support services, created specifically for the purposes of resource management, control and accountability. They are organized on a functional basis (groups of cognate specialties) and are vertically accountable. Clinical directorates are managerialist structures that link previously unaligned processes of service provision and resource management through explicit business planning. They frame service strategy, set and monitor targets for quality improvement, work on service developments, and manage team and individual performance (Fitzgerald and Ferlie 2000) . Within this organizational form, clinical directors are active clinical professionals but now also managers, with the responsibility of 'managing' professional colleagues, albeit with the support of professional managers. Appendix 1 reveals the clinical directorate structure in the hospital reported in this study.
The development of the clinical directorate structure is indicative of the push within the NPM toward strengthened vertical and functionally based patterns of public sector organizing. However, since the late 1990s there are some signs of a post-NPM model emerging within health management -as within other UK public service organizations -based on lateral or horizontal, rather than vertical modes of organizing. There is talk of a 'governance' model of organizing (Newman 2001) which supersedes the NPM, based on lateral rather than vertical relations. Indicative of such a shift is a range of related approaches: management through networks; partnership working between different agencies (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Glendinning et al. 2002) ; 'joined up government' and various types of process redesign (Locock 2001) , notably business process reengineering. These models all challenge the core principles of the NPM template, stressing lateral and process-based forms of organizing rather than vertical or functional principles. They are potentially a post-NPM approach to organizing. They invite the question: What happens when these new ideas and techniques are incorporated within existing NPM-style organizations organized on functional and vertical lines? Does the introduction of BPR lead, in an empirical case, to a radical transition towards a process-based and post-NPM mode of organizing?
Research Method
The study concerns a flagship experiment in reengineering within UK healthcare. The data presented were collected during an evaluation of the reengineering programme funded by the UK's Department of Health. The evaluation contained both qualitative and quantitative components, the latter conducted by health economists from the University of Sheffield Centre for Health and Related Research, that together yielded complementary conclusions about the effects of the reengineering programme on hospital process and performance (Bowns and McNulty 1999) . This paper draws on data from the qualitative component of the evaluation which was based on a set of case studies conducted in different clinical settings within the experimental hospital. As a complement to the economic analysis, the main purpose of the qualitative study was to get inside the 'black box' of the hospital to undertake organizational process research. Pettigrew (1990 Pettigrew ( , 1997 defines process research as the dynamic study of behaviour within organizations, focusing on the core themes of organizational context and actions that unfold over time. Specifically, the study sought to explore: how change took place or did not take place; who supported the change process and who resisted; and what underlying power resources were brought to bear to influence the outcomes of the change process. The research thus took place in naturally occurring rather than artificially created or restricted settings.
The specific methods used reflected our qualitative research design. Throughout the fieldwork and data analysis we sought to assure high levels of internal validity through undertaking intensive, longitudinal and pluralistic forms of fieldwork. Data were collected from four main sources: interview data; documentary and archival data; notes taken from informal conversations; and observational data gathered at meetings. This use of triangulation is an important check on internal validity. This was further enhanced by the presence of two researchers who agreed joint working arrangements. The two researchers on occasions jointly conducted interviews (about 10% of all interviews); worked to an agreed interview core pro forma; experienced meetings of the same clinical groups; commented on each other's case reports; and worked jointly on some cases. The qualitative data were also triangulated alongside the quantitative evaluation.
Data collection occurred between March 1995 and March 1998, incorporating a range of stakeholders involved in reengineering. Data were collected through interviews (n = 144), documentary and archival analysis, informal conversations and meetings (n = 50) observed. To analyse the implementation and impact of reengineering with due attention to the breadth and depth of change, data were collected at three levels of analysis: the corporate, clinical directorate and clinical settings. Six clinical settings were identified as case studies nested within the overall case study. The study generated detailed accounts of patient process redesign interventions in specialties of: ear, nose and throat; accident and emergency; orthopaedics; gastroenterology; and two services within gynaecology (elective gynaecology and menstrual clinic). The cases enabled detailed analysis of the transformational claims and rhetoric of BPR by focusing on empirically observable change to patient services as key indicators of hospital process and performance.
Differences in accounts quickly became apparent, confirming the importance of interviewing a range of different stakeholders (clinicians, nurses, middle managers, trade unionists, management consultants) in addition to senior management (see Appendix 2). Interviewees were those individuals who were revealed as actors in the reengineering process, because of their role, organizational status or experience. Respondents were also sampled at the three levels identified earlier (corporate centre, directorate and clinical setting) and across different occupational groups (clinicians, managers, nurses and management consultants) as an early review of change theory had sensitized us to the need to track change at multiple levels and to uncover interactions between them. Some role-holders were sampled on a uniform basis across the different clinical settings studied (e.g. clinical directors) so that comparisons could be drawn. Finally, there was an element of opportunistic or snowball sampling as, in the course of fieldwork, names of individuals, outside of the above categories, were suggested as significant to reengineering and hospital processes.
In process analysis, it is important to balance what people say they do (espoused behaviour) against what they actually do (observed behaviour). The study design also included observation of many meetings of groups at the three levels of analysis already identified earlier. About 50 meetings were observed in total as these meetings enabled watching and recording in a systematic way the behaviour and interactions of people within decisionmaking groups related to the reengineering programme. They provided an opportunity to observe group discussions about the progress of the reengineering programme as expressed by many individuals, and alternative meanings and interpretations of reengineering within the site.
Processual research should be sensitive to the passage of time, so case studies should be longitudinal rather than cross-sectional in nature. History can play an important role as antecedent conditions may determine the fate of the change programme. The local 'prehistory' can be dated to the early creation of clinical directorates in the mid-1980s. The collection and analysis of documentary materials was a method for incorporating the past. Archival data were gathered on the history of the hospital, the transition to NHS Trust status, the introduction of clinical directorates and earlier quality initiatives. More directly, documents were used to trace the genesis and early development of the BPR programme.
Finally, data were collected through numerous informal conversations ('corridor chat') that took place, facilitated by the researchers' presence on the site for a long time. While these conversations were not taped or transcribed, they yielded important data that served as a precursor to an interview, and which were captured in fieldnotes. The evaluation was deliberately designed to be summative rather than formative in nature, so as to maximize national level learning. The local site already had ample learning opportunities through extensive consultancy support and internal management development schemes.
The remainder of the paper presents empirical material from this study. The overall interpretation of the case is outlined in a fuller research monograph (McNulty and Ferlie 2002) which outlines narratives (Langley 1999 ) of all the cases formed from raw data collected at three levels of organization and analysed inductively. Distinctive to this paper is a short synthetic narrative that crosses corporate, directorate and specialty levels of analysis. We also here develop further our theoretical ideas. We consider the development and impact of BPR-led change in the context of a wider debate about the possibilities of moves to new and radically different lateral forms of organizing in public service organizations which move on from the embedded new public management archetype.
The Development and Impact of Reengineering in a UK Hospital
This next part of the paper analyses the development and impact of the reengineering programme. It begins with a tabulated overview of key events and points in the reengineering programme, followed by a theoretically informed narrative that analyses the overall pattern of development and impact of the programme (Table 1) .
Reengineering: Precipitating and Enabling Dynamics
Resonating with the model of radical change by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) , we found wider market and institutional pressures precipitated managerial action to try to transform the hospital using the ideas and techniques of business process reengineering. The adoption of reengineering as a radical change strategy sprang from the interpretation of institutional and organizational pressures by members of hospital senior management. The introduction of the NHS internal market -in which a previously integrated NHS decoupled into organizations that purchased healthcare and organizations that provided healthcare using contracts -and the winning of NHS Trust status (as the new and more autonomous organizational form on the providing side) were critical antecedent conditions that preceded the hospital's reengineering programme. Subject to these institutional pressures the hospital simultaneously converged with and diverged from its peers within its field. It converged in adopting the new NHS Trust form of organization, yet used Trust status as a platform to embark on a distinctive change programme that marked the hospital out as an innovator in its field. Ideas of business process reengineering, allied to the results of a previous quality improvement initiative (Project Sigma), contributed to senior managers' dissatisfaction with the hospital's ability to meet the simultaneous cost and quality improvement pressures emanating from national policy level and local healthcare purchasers.
September 1992
The hospital initiates five projects as part of the Regional Health Authority's Project Sigma initiative designed to improve the quality of outpatient services.
July 1993
Senior managers and clinicians use the concept of reengineering to make sense of variable results of five Project Sigma initiatives.
October 1993 A concept paper about reengineering is prepared by the hospital and is part of formal submission to the NHS Executive (national government agency for the NHS) for the hospital to pilot the application of reengineering to healthcare.
November 1993
Clinical, managerial and trade union leaders are introduced to the concept of reengineering at a strategic direction 'time-out'.
January 1994 A programme initiation document titled 'Re-engineering the healthcare process' is prepared. The document invites the NHS Management Executive to sponsor the reengineering intervention.
July 1994
The Report of a Scoping Study identifies core organizational processes to be reengineered, programme objectives and timescales.
July 1994 NHS Executive recognize, with financial support, the hospital as a national pilot site for reengineering.
August 1994
The reengineering intervention formally commences. Work starts on the redesign of the core processes of patient visit and diagnostic test processes.
January 1995
The hospital seeks and receives continuing support of the NHS Executive to move onto the next phase of reengineering.
March 1995
Four new reengineering laboratories are created for the purposes of redesigning the four core processes of 'emergency entry', 'patient stay', 'patient visit', and 'clinical support services'.
October 1995 The process of dissolving reengineering laboratories starts as part of a process that sees formal responsibility for reengineering shift from a centralized programme to clinical directorates.
May 1996
The Re-engineering Steering Group recognize that reengineering will have to continue beyond May 1996. Senior management of the hospital are committed to continuing to reengineer the hospital. May 31st, the date for formal completion of the programme, is spoken of as 'the end of the beginning'.
August 1997
The language of radical performance transformation has been replaced by talk amongst leaders of the reengineering intervention of 'incremental revolution' Table 1 .
Milestones of a Reengineering Programme
Features of the hospital's wider operating environment were thus mobilized by members of senior management to justify and prepare a case for radical organizational change presented to strategic constituencies inside and outside the hospital. Such processes of choice and change were simultaneously a reactive and proactive response by hospital management who saw both threats and opportunities associated with the new corporate status of NHS Trust as requiring radical change in hospital process and performance.
The concept of reengineering informed increasing dissatisfaction with existing organizational resources and performance. For one individual (who became leader of the reengineering programme), the concept of business process reengineering promised a very different and more fruitful approach to quality improvement than that previously taken in the previous Sigma experiments. ' "Sigma" set out to deliver significant improvements in the quality and economy of services to patients. Two [out of five] "Sigma" projects exceeded all expectations ... the most successful projects were redesigned from a process perspective.'
For another senior manager in the hospital, accountable for achieving policy-driven cost and service quality improvements, reengineering appealed as an approach which might radically change the cost base and quality benchmarks of the hospital. ' ... when we looked at our level of productivity compared to other sites we were a reasonably high unit in terms of efficiency ... we knew our ability to take one or two percent off year after year and continue to have to improve our volume of services, as well as quality, was just not a realistic prospect.' (senior manager, August 1995) At board level, some individuals cited their experience of private sector business practice to express dissatisfaction with hospital performance and managerial arrangements for securing performance outputs and results.
'I think it was recognized that there had to be a better way of doing things. Secondly we had to address the question of costs. There is constant pressure within the NHS to make better use of the money available to us and to release the full potential of the amount of money that could be used for redistribution within healthcare ... and do more work with the same level of resource ... as far as reengineering is concerned these things do not have to be seen to be competing with one another. That is to say we do not have to sacrifice quality to get cost reduction.' (member of NHS Trust Board, December 1995) Some medical champions publicly reported the impressive results of a recent service quality initiative to be a result of totally reorganizing services for the benefits of patients and not staff. Subsequently, further support and legitimacy for the programme was mobilized outside the hospital, by securing financial resources from the NHS Executive for the hospital to become a national pilot site for reengineering, and public endorsement of the programme by reengineering guru Michael Hammer.
The reengineering programme commenced in August 1994, championed by senior managers, including the chief executive and medical director, as a radical change methodology by which the hospital could meet the intensifying demands upon the hospital relating to the volume, quality, efficiency and effectiveness of patient care. The intervention was akin to the classical reengineering prescription in terms of ambition and organization (Hammer and Champy 1993) . The highly publicized ambition was dramatic improvement in all areas of hospital performance by summer 1996. Management consultants were appointed to work alongside internal change agents, seconded from their existing roles within the hospital, in specially created reengineering laboratories. Buoyed by progress in reengineering of both diagnostic services and outpatient services in autumn 1994, the ambition of the intervention peaked in early 1995 when reengineering was extended to all patient services within the hospital, using a rhetoric of four core business processes -'emergency entry', 'patient stay', 'patient visit' and 'clinical support services'.
The Impact of Reengineering
Emergency services, elective inpatient surgery and outpatient services were all subject to redesign. The reengineering programme was used to promote segmentation and redesign of services for clinically discrete groups of patients. Having developed a concept of an effective clinic, redesign activity involved: reducing 'hand-offs' within clinic processes by creating clinic teams; creating the role of clinic coordinator to combine a number of clerical functions within one role; and better scheduling of patient attendance at clinic. Over 100 outpatient clinics were redesigned and 'single visit clinics' were established in a number of specialties, including rheumatology, gastroenterology, cardiovascular medicine and gynaecology, to compress the time from diagnosis to prognosis and treatment. Clinic redesign benefited from simultaneous redesign of clinical support services, such as radiology, pathology and pharmacy, and the development of a patient-testing facility created to perform multiple test functions, such as simple blood analysis, ECG and basic radiology, which was located next to the hospital's major outpatient clinics.
Identification and development of 'care pathways' was promoted through the reengineering programme. Notable examples include redesign of the care pathway or process for patients admitted: with musculo-skeletal injuries including a fractured neck of femur; for certain ear, nose and throat (ENT) procedures; for elective gynaecological surgery.
Notwithstanding these particular changes, service change that spanned the breadth and depth of the hospital was hard to observe. The majority of patients did not experience redesigned healthcare processes. Case studies of emergency care processes and elective day case and inpatient care indicate that changes in these settings were even more difficult to achieve (McNulty and Ferlie 2002) . This study observed the adoption and impact of reengineering to vary enormously across clinical specialties and directorates within the hospital. Obstetrics and gynaecology was one clinical directorate where reengineering resources and ideas contributed to service change for a relatively large number of both inpatients and outpatients. By comparison reengineering resources and related ideas were limited in use and impact in other directorates and specialties. Furthermore, it is difficult to relate many of the redesign interventions to generic core processes identified at the outset of the reengineering programme. A principle of reengineering and process is that horizontal changes need to be made at the work interfaces. However, a core finding was that making change across the interfaces of existing specialties and clinical directorates proved to be a slow and difficult process. Redesign interventions that crossed specialty and directorate boundaries were difficult to start and sustain. Relatedly, the considerable variation in the rate and pace of reengineering across clinical specialties and directorates of the hospital led to a situation in which the impact of the process redesign in one part of the healthcare system was reduced by a lack of change in another part of the hospital. Case studies of the care process for patients admitted for ENT surgery and with a fractured neck of femur are illustrative of the problem the reengineering programme experienced in creating multiple, interconnected changes across the hospital as a healthcare system. For example, effects of redesigning the care of orthopaedic patients were limited by a lack of change in some other aspect of the care process, for instance accident and emergency services and social services (McNulty and Ferlie 2002) .
Process management was introduced within the established clinical directorate structure as an attempt to strengthen managerial accountability and responsibility for patient processes at specialty and directorate levels. It was also an attempt to improve managerial communication and decision making across specialties and directorates. It is embodied in a set of new roles at these levels based on a clinical director working with a patient process director within each directorate. Other key roles are those of process manager, responsible to a process director, and head of clinical service. Nonetheless, clinical directorates and specialties survived as forms of organization within the hospital without significant reconfiguration of the previous pattern.
In the light of our earlier discussion of the concept of transformation, we are doubtful that these observed effects constitute evidence of organizational transformation (Ferlie et al. 1996; Greenwood and Hinings 1996) . The impact of reengineering on hospital services, costs and organization was not as dramatic as initially anticipated. The overall efficiency of the hospital was not transformed as assessed through a quantitative evaluation of its performance. The hospital was already one of the most efficient hospitals before reengineering. Over the period 1994-98 the hospital retained or even slightly improved upon its relative efficiency but without securing radical transformation in the hospital's overall efficiency (Bowns and McNulty 1999) . Some cashreleasing savings (approximately £500,000-600,000 per annum) were made, mainly as a result of staffing changes in outpatients. These were less than envisaged at the outset of the programme and not of the magnitude to repay the initial investment in the reengineering programme, reported to be £4m. In spite of the service changes above, the dramatic gains originally anticipated did not materialise. A target of 20% reductions in length of patient stay in hospital was not achieved overall or even for certain groups that were the focus of dedicated reengineering efforts. The delays experienced by patients were not reduced by a magnitude of 66% as initially anticipated. There is much less evidence of interconnected and coherent process redesign across the hospital as a healthcare system than espoused in the BPR rhetoric. While the nomenclature of process management has been introduced into job titles, it remained the case that process management and ongoing attention to process redesign occurred within the already established framework of clinical specialties and clinical directorates. Process management and process redesign are therefore framed and constrained by an organizational form that reinforces values of clinical specialization and promotes vertical reporting rather than horizontal working.
To summarize, while the intended strategy of reengineering was radical and revolutionary in ambition and method, the emergent strategy of reengineering proved to be more evolutionary than revolutionary. Change was more convergent than transformational in its impact on the processes of organizing and managing the hospital. We conclude that the effects of the reengineering programme did not constitute 'organizational transformation' or a wholesale shift from a functional to process-based mode of organization.
Explaining Impact: Necessary but Insufficient Conditions for Radical Change
How then do we explain our finding that reengineering has not resulted in the radical impact anticipated by its champions? At this point attention turns more to conditions of reproduction than transformation. The precipitating and enabling dynamics that enabled the initial introduction of reengineering into the hospital proved necessary but insufficient for reengineering to produce the long-term impact desired by senior hospital managers. Initial dynamics of interest dissatisfaction and the exercise of power at senior management level created a capacity for reengineering action in 1994 but did not develop sufficiently over time to generate power dependencies and an effective capacity for action associated with radical change .
Among the corpus of managers and clinicians within the hospital, reengineering failed to generate sufficient dissatisfaction with existing organizational arrangements to mobilize a reformative or competitive-value commitment to reengineer the hospital. The effects of this limitation upon the implementation and impact of reengineering heightened as senior management was not able to extend internal or external change agent capacity down into all the directorates and had to work with existing directorate-based line managers to try to effect momentum for reengineering.
Outside its initial champions, reengineering failed to generate a critical mass of champions throughout the hospital. Reengineering was not seen as widely helpful to the operational problems and agendas of managers and clinicians. The value-commitment of clinicians and managers at key operating levels of the hospital was more inclined to preservation of the existing status quo. Clinicians and managers with directorate and speciality membership in common often found a joint 'jurisdiction' to manage and defend. Instead of conflict between clinicians and directorate managers, we see a relatively stable 'negotiated order' based on local managers and clinicians working alongside and often challenging or at least reinterpreting higher-level proposals for process redesign.
At directorate and specialty levels many individuals -both clinical and managerial -did not support the change agenda being set for them by reengineers and management consultants and saw fit to challenge, with some success, the objectives and logic of proposed changes. A major challenge to core process redesign was the argument by managers and clinicians within directorates and specialties that hospitals have hundreds, if not thousands, of processes and product lines, because of the vast array of patient conditions that need to be treated. This line of argument proved a very effective rhetorical defence of directorate and specialty practice against imposition of change from outside the specialty and directorate. The following remark reveals how within the medical directorate, the largest of all directorates, reengineering encountered a prior strategy of clinical specialty development. The directorate's subsequent strategy proved to be an uneasy combination of principles of specialty development with process thinking.
'Reengineering was something they did not really want in here [medical directorate]. Reengineering was not a word that you said here, there was in tandem a reorganization going on around specialties which was not really about the process, it was about developing clinical specialties. ' (management respondent, July 1996) In practice, the handful of core processes devised by the reengineering teams proved insufficiently robust at the redesign stage. The directorates themselves carried a variable appetite for BPR (and managerial capacity to implement it). 'Successes' in process redesign followed imperatives at the level of a particular patient group, a medical consultant, specialty or a single directorate rather than some overarching logic associated with 'core processes'. The introduction and implementation of reengineering as a managerial technology for organizational transformation was thus mediated through existing organizing arrangements and ended up preserving rather than reforming those established organizing arrangements and associated interests and power relations. ' We took the view very early on that we were not going to develop a generic project.' (manager, obstetrics and gynaecology directorate, January 1996) 'You cannot make them [medical consultants] toe the line. You have to make it good for them to toe the line. It is about getting solutions to their problems that are also solutions to yours ... ' (manager, obstetrics and gynaecology directorate, September 1996) As the ambition and organization of the reengineering programme were diluted by managers and clinicians operating within specialty and directorate arrangements, the reformative spirit implied by BPR as a change technology was weakened, the initial strategic intent dissolved and the vision of core processes lost. This conclusion again portrays the importance of interests and politics within processes of change and shows reengineering not to be a neutral technology for change but one that is seen to have implications for and to threaten existing arrangements. At a general theoretical level, the description and analysis of reengineering in this case confirms the thesis that change initiatives are shaped and can be transformed by the very conditions and dynamics they are supposed to transform (Child 1997) . The case therefore supports the theorized link between existing interests and convergent change .
The adaptation of the reengineering methodology to suit the circumstances of the directorates was a successful defence of existing organizing arrangements. There was no radical move to a lateral-based mode of organization around the four core processes identified, and the configuration of clinical directorates and specialties was largely undisturbed. The formal boundaries between clinical directorates remained stable, and proposals for directorate mergers were not implemented. We conclude that the vertically and functionally organized clinical directorates retained an important power base throughout the reengineering experiment. Not only did the clinical directorates survive; their presence also considerably shaped the BPR implementation process. They did not simply 'resist change'; but rather tried actively to create change more acceptable to them, based on more clinically driven criteria.
The theorized conflict between process and functional models of organizing (Denison 1997) helps us develop an understanding of the failure of reengineering to generate sufficient power dependencies and interest dissatisfaction needed to create radical change. The conflict was exposed and became more explicit as responsibility for reengineering '... went into the directorates and specialties ... ' (reengineer, 1996) . For those leading the reengineering programme there was always a tension between their control of the programme and the need to engender ownership of and commitment to reengineering interventions at operational levels of the hospital. This diffusion of responsibility among directorates increased the possibilities for directorates and specialties to interpret and apply reengineering logic to suit local parochial interests and agendas. Specialties and directorates were organizational arrangements that afforded managers and clinicians a position from which they could interpret, evaluate and negotiate the reengineering agenda. Clinicians and managers with directorate and specialty membership in common found a jurisdiction and accompanying set of arrangements to defend, albeit perhaps for different reasons. Managers and clinicians were able to control the implications of reengineering for the purpose of protecting local agendas and preferences. This left existing functionally inclined arrangements, such as specialty and clinical directorates, with associated resource patterns and demarcations, largely preserved and unchallenged. The considerable change activity related to reengineering across and within directorates is thus adjudged to be rather uneven, incoherent and patchy in impact. Emerging from this explanation of differentiated and patchy impact is the finding that managers and professionals acted in ways that supported the preservation of existing 'functional' organizing arrangements at the expense of new, process-based ways of organizing.
Conclusions: Public Service Organizations -The Resilience of the NPM and Limits to Process Transformation
Our study suggests that there may be obstacles to radical forms of change within contemporary public service organizations, and that in particular it may prove difficult to break with an established NPM pattern. This has wider relevance to many current change efforts designed to 'transform' public service organizations which go well beyond reengineering (a more recent example would be the use of 'turnaround leadership' in failing public service organizations). The NPM wave has produced the creation and development of strong vertical principles of organizing within public service organizations (Ferlie et al. 1996) . Currently, laterally based principles of organizing are being promoted as a potential successor to highly integrated forms within private sector settings (Denison 1997) . Within public policy, a rising rhetoric of 'managed networks', 'partnership working', 'joined-up government' and redesign is evident, all of which exemplify a lateral rather than a vertical perspective towards organizing and change (Newman 2001; Locock 2001; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Glendinning et al. 2002) . Some argue that this represents a post-NPM successor form. A key contribution of the paper is to present empirical data on what happens when new ideas and techniques for lateral and process-based organizing are incorporated within existing NPMstyle organizations with strong functional and vertical lines.
This in-depth case study suggests the impact of reengineering within a UK hospital was limited by managers and clinicians operating within an organizational form that embraced NPM and vertical principles of organizing and which made it difficult to adopt a coherent process-based logic of organization. Through the responses and actions of clinicians and managers operating within a clinical directorate structure, contradictions between the continuing demands of NPM-style organizations for reporting and accountability and newer process-based thinking were observed, with the former proving to be dominant. Why should the challenge from process thinking prove relatively ineffectual?
Weak and Incoherent Reformative Ideology
First, the national health policy system (at least in the UK) has continued to promote NPM-style logic, while at the same time claiming to move away from it. National policy initatives contain 'mixed messages'. Its 'reformative commitment' to a coherent post-NPM model is weak and confused: there is typically one step forward; but then two steps back in terms of moving beyond NPM principles. At one level, there is a new 'joined-up' rhetoric. But there is also a strong and continuing stress on performance measurement (Power 1997 ) and a performance management culture. Such performance measurement and management takes place around distinct units which report up the line. A performance manager is most comfortable with a vertical mode of organization as it is much easier for the performance manager to hold a defined and subordinate entity (such as a directorate) accountable, than a loose network or a 'value chain'.
Little Customer Pressure
Second, by 1998, there was little in the way of market forces and customer pressure to force reconfiguration around lateral 'value creating' processes (Denison 1997) . This reflected the waning and then abolition of the internal market experiment within the NHS. Even before the change of government in 1997, market forces had failed to take off in the manner which managers had thought would place performance pressures on the hospital in the early 1990s. Indeed, the anticipating of escalating market forces was one reason for adopting a strategy of 'big bang' change: the usual strategy of incremental expenditure reductions was seen as no longer sufficient. Denison (1997) identified customer and market pressure as a key driver for the shift towards lateral forms: yet the NHS quasi-market became progressively less of a free market and more of a highly managed market in which market signals were too weak to force organizational change. Purchasers were discouraged from switching contracts if this meant that the financial position of a hospital were to be destabilized: the market was not allowed to lead to market exit by failing providers.
'Deep Structures of Clinical Work'
Third, the underlying occupational structure and organization of clinical work influenced the outcomes of the change programme as well as subjective factors such as 'strong leadership' overemphasised in the normative BPR texts (Hammer and Champy 1993) and currently also in such strategies as 'turnaround leadership' promoted in the current cycle of reforming. A reliance on 'strong leadership' by itself is a weak basis for transformational organizational change in large, complex and professionalized organizations. Senior management's ability to fully engineer and control change cannot here be assumed. The study confirms the indifference and resistance that planned, programmed top-down change strategies may face, not just from clinical professionals in this case, but also middle managers. Senior management was not at all an all-dominant power bloc served by a uniform and malleable middle management. So top management support and action for change in this case proved a necessary but insufficient condition for achieving BPRinspired transformation. Classic reengineering methodology reflects a topdown model of change management based on assumptions of clear line management and relatively uncontested managerial control (Hammer and Champy 1993) . In hospitals such conditions do not apply and as such the methodology is flawed and ill suited to the practical challenges of transforming organization performance. It was not possible to re-create deep occupational structures which shape the organization of clinical work through bringing in a few external personnel (such as management consultants) with new ideas. Existing actors did not simply 'resist change', but they were heavily involved in the shaping of the new as they used their managerial role in respect of clinical directorates to crucially influence the enactment of BPR on their own terms and that of their respective directorates. Actors at specialty and directorate levels used their position and power resources to blunt the influence and aspirations of external 'change agents' (such as management consultants) and internal change agents (reengineers) who, at least initially, aspired to more radical, transformational ambitions. That they were able to do so within supportive relationships with clinicians is a point which merits further discussion below.
Professional Control, Sedimented Change and Stable Clinical Managerial Hybrids
Fourth, the findings remind us once again of the continuing power of doctors in the provision of healthcare: we found no case study in which BPR was successfully imposed on a clinician. While senior management could influence clinicians, they could not directly control them. More surprisingly, we found clinicians allying with their local managers with whom they had often built up a strong day-to-day working relationship at directorate and specialty levels. It will be recalled that the variant of NPM found in NHS organizations combined clinical and managerial principles with a clinical directorate form (Kitchener 1999) . The traditional analysis of healthcare organizations stresses conflict between clinical and managerial elements (Alford 1975; Harrison and Pollitt 1994 ). An implication is that 'hybrid' or 'sedimented' structures such as clinical directorates should be vulnerable to internal tensions and contradictions between their clinical and managerial poles. The counterintuitive pattern of collaboration found between clinicians and local managers against senior management and external change agents suggests that the 'sedimented' arrangements observable within this UK hospital displayed unexpected resilience. The stability of the clinical managerial hybrid form helps to explain why clinicians and managers were able to 'fend off' the prospect of process-based organizing arrangements. The resilience of these sedimented arrangements is of theoretical and practical significance for several reasons. First, sedimented conditions have previously been theorized as schizoid and insecure forms (Cooper et al. 1996) . Second, sedimented conditions in healthcare (Kitchener 1999) exhibit an unforeseen coherence more supportive of functional rather than process organization. Third, the unlikely collaboration between managers and professionals found in this instance suggests that managerial-professional relations are more nuanced and contingent than some earlier literature suggests (Harrison and Pollitt 1994; Alford 1975) .
More generally, the findings of this study encourage further attention to the presumed limits to the stability and durability of sedimented conditions in organizations. The collaboration involving managers and professionals in defence of existing organizing arrangements suggest that research and debate about sedimentation needs to progress beyond a concern simply with explaining the creation of sedimented conditions as an outcome of institutional pressures for change, to an interest in understanding sedimentation as a critical condition of dynamic professional service contexts that shapes the process and possibilities of further organizational change.
Lessons for Current Policy
Finally, the study suggests uncomfortable lessons for current UK -and perhaps international -public policy, its implementation and management. The present aspiration towards greater integration and lateral working in healthcare clashes with the set of existing functional arrangements, such as clinical directorates, which have been strengthened considerably over the last decade, originally to get the NHS ready for the internal market experiment but more recently to strengthen top-down accountability, target setting and performance management of public services. Can one balance these two principles of management or is there a fundamental contradiction between them? The continuance of old NPM-based forms retards the possibility of achieving desired transformational change across the whole organization. Instead, incremental or 'hybrid' change within existing organizational forms appears a more likely prospect. The two organizing principles are then contradictory within transformational change efforts. There is a rich seam of irony here: previous public sector reforms launched in the name of better management have strengthened vertical lines of authority and reporting within UK public organizations. They are still embedded and may be proving antithetical to the growth of post-NPM process-based organizations supported by a new policy rhetoric. The resilience of these 'deep structures' predicts continuing limitations to reform strategies designed to achieve 'big bang' change in public service organizations, especially those reliant on purely subjective interventions such as 'top managerial leadership'. 
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